Hwasong-11S
Hwasong-11S | |
---|---|
Type | Submarine-launched ballistic missile |
Place of origin | North Korea |
Service history | |
In service | 2021-present |
Used by | Korean People's Army |
Production history | |
Designed | 2021 |
Specifications | |
Length | 6.8 m (22 ft)[1] or 8.45 m (27.7 ft)[2] |
Diameter | 1 m (3 ft 3 in)[1] |
Warhead | Likely nuclear-capable[3] |
Engine | Solid-propelled engine |
Operational range | Reported: About 600 km (370 mi)[1] |
Launch platform | Submarine, submersible barge, underwater silo |
The Hwasong-11S[a] (Korean: 《화성포-11ㅅ》형; lit. Mars Artillery Type 11S) is a North Korean solid-fueled submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM).
Description
[edit]Images of the Hwasong-11S | |
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In the "Self-Defence 2021" exhibition | |
September 2022 test |
Hwasong-11S is the underwater-launched variant of the Hwasong-11A (KN-23) missile.[5] It is a single-stage, solid-fueled missile with four bumps around the tail section. Four grid fins, which folded before launch, are located between the four bumps. After its maiden launch, it was determined that the bumps and grid fins were a part of the gas generator.[6] The new missile also features improved control, such as "flank" and "gliding skip" mobilities.[7]
German analyst Norbert Brügge claimed the missile to be a modified version of Pukguksong-1 with two stages, a longer body and a longer warhead.[2]
Informations from the 19 October 2021 launch suggest that the missile is fitted with a gas generator to cold launch out of the submarine's missile tube into the air, before the main engine ignites. Compared to previous North Korean SLBMs like the Pukguksong-1 and its larger derivatives, it retains the depressed trajectory and manoeuvring flight characteristics of Hwasong-11A (KN-23) to try to evade missile defence systems. Since it is based on a missile with a shorter range than the Pukguksong-series, the submarine would need to get closer to its target in order to launch, leaving it more vulnerable to detection and destruction before it can fire. Its development may be more of a political statement than an effort to create a viable weapon, as the test occurred weeks after South Korea tested their own Hyunmoo-2B's SLBM version, Hyunmoo 4-4, both of which are derived from the same Iskander design base.[6][8]
Based on informations and photos on the 25 September 2022 launch, it was determined that the missile was launched from a silo under a reservoir.[9] However, it is likely the missile was fired from a submersible barge containing launch silos. It is unknown whether such a system will be pursued as a serious launch method, or if it was a demonstration of another capability to deter South Korean preemption strategies by adding another potential deployment method.[10]
History
[edit]North Korea first displayed Hwasong-11S in October 2021, during the "Self-Defence 2021" military exhibition without revealing its official name. In the exhibition, the missile was displayed beside two SLBMs: Pukguksong-1 and Pukguksong-5.[11] Due to its small size compared to the Pukguksong-series SLBM, it was unofficially called as "small SLBM".[12]
Test-fires for Hwasong-11S were first carried out on 19 October 2021, and again on 25 September 2022.[13] Between two test-fires, eight Hwasong-11S missiles were displayed in the 25 April 2022 military parade. Like the test-fires, North Korea also did not reveal official designation.[3][14] An alleged test-fire occurred on 7 May 2022.[15]
The missile's official name was revealed in the KCNA's report on the new Hwasan-31 nuclear warhead in late March 2023.[16][17]
According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), as of 2024, North Korea is possessing "some" Hwasong-11S missiles. These missiles are assessed as "in test" by the IISS.[18]
Tests
[edit]Attempt | Date | Location | Outcome | Additional notes |
---|---|---|---|---|
1 | 19 October 2021 | Sinpo-class submarine,[8] located at Sinpo Shipyard, South Hamgyong Province[13] | Success | The missile reportedly travelled about 600 km (370 mi) and reached an altitude of 60 km (37 mi).[6][8] Japanese data showed the launch of two missiles, despite the North Korean's claim of one missile launch.[19] North Korea did not reveal the missile's official designation in this test.[7] |
(Unconfirmed) | 7 May 2022 | Sinpo Shipyard, Sinpo, South Hamgyong Province[13] | Unknown | North Korea did not release a statement about the launch. The missile flew 600 km (370 mi) for less than 18 minutes, achieved 60 km (37 mi) apogee and used an irregular trajectory.[13][15] |
2 | 25 September 2022 | Taechon Reservoir, North Pyongan Province[13] | Success | The missile was launched from an underwater silo, under an inland reservoir. North Korea referred to the launch as "the simulation of loading tactical nuclear warheads". Kim Jong Un oversaw the launch. North Korea also did not mention the missile's official name in this test.[9] |
See also
[edit]- Hwasong-11A (KN-23)
- Hwasong-11B (KN-24)
- Hwasong-11C
- Hwasong-11D
Notes
[edit]References
[edit]- ^ a b c "S/2022/132" (PDF). United Nations Security Council. 2022-03-01. Retrieved 2025-01-02.
- ^ a b "PS-1 mod". b14643.eu. Retrieved 2025-01-02.
- ^ a b "Overview of the DPRK's 25 April 2022 Military Parade" (PDF). Open Nuclear Network. 2 May 2022. Retrieved 2025-01-02.
- ^ "North Korea threat: Existing and potential ballistic weapons in the Russian arsenal". Miltarnyi. Retrieved 2025-01-02.
- ^ a b "Brief on 27 July 2023 Parade of the DPRK" (PDF). Open Nuclear Network. Retrieved 2025-01-02.
- ^ a b c "Brief on the 19 October 2021 Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile Test of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" (PDF). Open Nuclear Network. 20 October 2021. Retrieved 2025-01-02.
- ^ a b "Academy of Defence Science Succeeds in Test-Launch of New Type SLBM". Korean Central News Agency. 20 October 2021. Retrieved 2025-01-03.
- ^ a b c "North Korea's "New Type Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile": More Political Than Military Significance". 38 North. 22 October 2021. Retrieved 2025-01-02.
- ^ a b "Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Guides Military Drills of KPA Units for Operation of Tactical Nukes". Korean Central News Agency. 10 October 2022. Retrieved 2025-01-02. For images, see 1, 2, 3 and 4.
- ^ ""A Strong Military Warning:" Four Key Implications of North Korea's October 10 Missile Statement: More Political Than Military Significance". 38 North. 14 October 2022. Retrieved 2025-01-02.
- ^ "Brief on the Defence Development Exhibition of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea" (PDF). Open Nuclear Network. Retrieved 2025-01-02.
- ^ "North Korea's Small SLBM". Arms Control Wonk. 27 October 2021. Retrieved 2025-01-27.
- ^ a b c d e "The CNS North Korea Missile Test Database". Nuclear Threat Initiative. Retrieved 2025-01-03.
- ^ "S/2022/668" (PDF). United Nations Security Council. 7 September 2022. Retrieved 2025-01-27.
- ^ a b "S/2023/171" (PDF). United Nations Security Council. 4 March 2023. Retrieved 2025-01-28.
- ^ "North Korea reveals internal names for several missile systems: Analysis". NK Pro. 3 April 2023. Retrieved 2025-01-02.
- ^ "Respected Comrade Kim Jong Un Guides Work for Mounting Nuclear Warheads on Ballistic Missiles". Korean Central News Agency. 28 March 2023. Retrieved 2025-01-02.
- ^ International Institute for Strategic Studies (13 February 2024). The Military Balance 2024 (1st ed.). Routledge. p. 282. ISBN 978-1032780047.
- ^ NEWS, KYODO. "Japan maintains North Korea fired 2 ballistic missiles, not 1". Kyodo News+. Retrieved 2021-10-24.